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COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE 
LIMITS OF DISCLOSURE IN REGULATING 
GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS   
CHARLOTTE VILLIERS∗ 
Global supply chains present major challenges for company law and 
corporate governance, nationally and internationally. Their increasing 
relevance in international business has led to a serious regulatory gap, 
especially in light of corporate involvement in human rights abuses, labour 
exploitation and environmental degradation. Alongside a number of 
international norms such as those expressed in the UN’s Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights, there has been a proliferation in domestic 
and international law of disclosure provisions, mandating greater 
transparency by companies in response to the problems caused by global 
supply chains. In this paper, however, it is argued that disclosure is not a 
sufficient answer to such problems. It is suggested that we should approach 
the problems with a different conceptualisation of supply chain structures. If 
we regard them as ‘global poverty chains’, such a perspective brings about 
a moral response — a recognition that we have a collective responsibility to 
eradicate the poverty and suffering caused by the chains. This response 
necessitates that transparency requirements be altered and accompanied by 
a regulatory framework that empowers victims of poverty to be able to escape 
it.  
I INTRODUCTION 
Global supply chains present major challenges for company law and corporate 
governance, nationally and internationally. Their increasing relevance in 
international business has led to a regulatory gap — the failure of government 
to provide mechanisms to prevent corporate involvement in human rights 
abuses, labour exploitation and environmental degradation. This article 
evaluates the transparency measures — in the form of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, 
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mandatory and voluntary, national and international disclosure provisions — 
that have appeared as a leading regulatory response to the challenges presented 
by supply chains. Their proliferation is possibly explained by the fact that 
mandated disclosure is easier to introduce than more ‘direct and intrusive’ 
measures.1  
The structural complexity of supply chains presents obstacles to an effective 
disclosure system. Within such organisational complexity, which remains 
largely unquestioned, to whom are the disclosures to be made and who is to 
hold any misbehaving supply chain actors to account? I suggest, following Ben 
Selwyn,2 that we must adopt a different conceptualisation of these business 
structures; we must see them as global poverty chains, in which the lead 
companies earn vast profits and global inequality rises, resulting in an 
‘immiserated’ labour force in the global south (or developing countries) and an 
undermined and threatened labour force in the global north (or developed 
countries).3 This conceptualisation inspires a moral response to the processes 
that cause or contribute to human rights abuses and global inequality, and 
underlines the fact that we have a collective responsibility to eradicate the 
poverty and suffering caused by the supply, or poverty, chains. The disclosure 
requirements must then be developed into a regulatory framework that 
empowers those impoverished by them. Those who are privileged at the 
expense of the poor have a duty to end that poverty in a way that emancipates 
the exploited participants. Transparency should be part of a system that enables 
stakeholders to hold companies to account and to act together to end the 
structural injustices and to work genuinely to end the poverty and human 
suffering that blights so many regions of the world in the name of profit and 
economic growth. This requires a multi-dimensional but cohesive international 
legal and regulatory system rather than a fragmented collection of demands for 
information. 
This article proceeds by looking at the structural complexities found in supply 
chains. It identifies their negative impacts, concentrating especially on labour 
                                                 
1 Adam S Chilton and Galit A Sarfaty, ‘The Limitations of Supply Chain Disclosure Regimes’ 
(2017) 53 Stanford Journal of International Law 1, 21, citing Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl 
Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure (Princeton 
University Press, 2014) 4.   
2 Benjamin Selwyn, ‘Global Value Chains or Global Poverty Chains? A New Research Agenda’ 
(Working Paper No 10, University of Sussex, Centre for Global Political Economy, June 2016) 
2 <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/cgpe/research/workingpapers>. See also Benjamin Selwyn, 
‘Social Upgrading and Labour in Global Production Networks: A Critique and an Alternative 
Conception’ (2013) 17 Competition and Change 75. 
3 Arguably, Australia would be placed into the global north category as a developed country, for 
the purposes of this discussion. 
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exploitation and human rights abuses. It then examines the regulatory approach 
typical in neoliberal corporate governance regimes — the requirement of 
transparency — and demonstrates that transparency measures have not 
succeeded in solving the problems. Finally, it develops Selwyn’s 
reconceptualisation of these chains as global poverty chains and suggests a 
different regulatory response.   
II THE STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITIES OF SUPPLY CHAINS 
Global value chains are an established and widely used production arrangement 
and they are used in many industries, including manufacturing, the energy 
industry, the agri-food industry, and a myriad of financial and business 
services.4 They are characterised by an ‘international fragmentation of 
production’.5 The integrated components of design, production and retail, 
spread across either a few or thousands of firms, constitute the product or 
service.6 Since 2011, global value chain trade has accounted for 60–67 per cent 
of global trade in value-added terms.7 The United Nations Conference on Trade 
Development (UNCTAD) in its World Investment Report suggested that global 
value chains shaped by transnational corporations ‘account for some 80% of 
global trade’8 and the ILO has estimated that more than 450 million people 
work in supply chain-related jobs.9 
Global value chains spread themselves across geographic boundaries and 
across different legal systems and jurisdictions, leading the Institute for Global 
Law and Policy Working Group10 to observe that ‘mapping GVCs from a legal 
                                                 
4 Michael Rawling, ‘Legislative Regulation of Global Value Chains to Protect Workers: A 
Preliminary Assessment’ (2015) 26 The Economic and Labour Relations Review 660, 663. 
5 OECD, WTO and UNCTAD, Implications of Global Value Chains for Trade, Investment, 
Development and Jobs. Prepared for the G-20 Leaders Summit, Saint Petersburg (Russian 
Federation) (6 August 2013) 11 <http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx? 
publicationid=643>.  
6 Kevin B Sobel-Read, ‘Global Value Chains: A Framework for Analysis’ (2014) 5 
Transnational Legal Theory 364, 369. 
7 WTO and others, Global Value Chain Development Report 2017: Measuring and Analysing the 
Impact of GVCs on Economic Development (September 2017) 2 <https://www.wto. 
org/english/res_e/publications_e/gvcd_report_17_e.htm>.  
8 OECD, WTO and UNCTAD, above n 5, 21.  
9 International Labour Organization, ‘Forced Labour, Human Trafficking and Slavery’ (undated) 
<http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/lang--en/index.htm>. 
10 The Institute for Global Law and Policy (IGLP) is based at Harvard Law School and has the 
goal of nurturing innovative approaches to global policy. This Law and Global production 
Working Group’s mapping exercise is a project of the Institute and forms part of the work 
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perspective … poses complex challenges for basic questions of positive legal 
analysis, including matters of territorial jurisdiction, governing law, private 
regulation through contract and sovereign authority’.11 One consequence of 
their global reach is that global value chains have given rise to regulatory and 
governance gaps, allowing them to be conduits for profit, but at the expense of 
environmental damage, labour exploitation and human rights abuse.  
A major cause of the regulatory gap is the complexity of these chains. Not being 
strictly linear, they have, to change the metaphor [since chains cannot have 
tiers], multiple tiers and they have horizontal, vertical and spatial complexities 
that interact and lead to uncertainties, production disruptions12 and regulatory 
challenges. The fragmented nature of the production processes leads many 
chains to require multiple layers of suppliers. Often, companies may be able to 
locate their first-tier suppliers, but the suppliers in the lower tiers may be less 
easy to identify.13 Sarfaty reveals that one company required more than a year 
to map its supply chain,14 and quotes an employee of the technology company, 
Philips, explaining that, ‘for electronic components, the supply chain can easily 
be 50 tiers deep, many of which may provide us with limited or no 
information’.15 In 2015, Clarke and Boersma reported that Apple had 785 
suppliers in 31 countries worldwide contributing to the production of the 
iPhone.16 Some commentators identify different types of complexity: static 
complexity — the structure of the supply chain, the number and the variety of 
its components and the strength of the interactions between these components; 
                                                 
within the project on Corporate Power in Global Society: Explication, Critique, Engagement, 
and Resistance. See further at ˂http://iglp.law.harvard.edu/research-agenda-and-history/˃. 
11 The IGLP Law and Global Production Working Group, ‘The Role of Law in Global Value 
Chains: A Research Manifesto’ (2016) 4 London Review of International Law 57, 61–2. 
12 Christoph Bode and Stephan M Wagner, ‘Structural Drivers of Upstream Supply Chain 
Complexity and the Frequency of Supply Chain Disruptions’ (2015) 36 Journal of Operations 
Management 215. 
13 Galit A Sarfaty, ‘Shining Light on Global Supply Chains’ (2015) 56 Harvard International 
Law Journal 419, 431. 
14 Shift Project, ‘Respecting Human Rights through Global Supply Chains, 7 (2012) cited in 
Sarfaty, above n 13, 432. 
15 Ibid 431. 
16 Thomas Clarke and Martijn Boersma, ‘The Governance of Global Value Chains: Unresolved 
Human Rights, Environmental and Ethical Dilemmas in the Apple Supply Chain’ (2017) 143 
Journal of Business Ethics 111, 115. 
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and dynamic complexity — the uncertainty in the supply chain on aspects of 
production time and supply chain relations.17  
Global value chains have fluid arrangements and they lack predictability, 
making them vulnerable to political instability, technological changes, and new 
legal requirements. Such changing conditions give to them a dynamic nature, 
but maintaining updated lists of suppliers and sub-suppliers becomes difficult. 
Indeed, some suppliers, as a result of competition pressures or fluctuations in 
the price or range of goods, further subcontract parts of their production to other 
firms that are not directly linked to the buyer and which may include smaller 
companies, informal workshops and home-based workers who will work 
informally and remain unknown to the lead firm.18 Thus, while multinational 
corporations (MNCs) might be incorporated and headquartered in a particular 
jurisdiction, many of their economic activities occur abroad in areas that are 
beyond the regulatory reach of their home jurisdiction, or they may operate in 
developing countries which do not have sufficient resources or structures for 
effective regulation.19 As Chilton and Sarfaty observe, where host states lack 
the political capacity, the rule of law, and/or the will to enforce human rights 
norms and provide redress to victims of human rights violations, such 
regulatory gaps open up.20 Those host states are primarily concerned with 
attracting foreign investment, leading them to overlook domestic law violations 
or to hold off on passing human rights regulations, fearing that companies might 
shift their business elsewhere to avoid regulatory burdens.21 Global value 
chains have the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage, giving rise to governance 
                                                 
17 Seyda Serdarasan, ‘A Review of Supply Chain Complexity Drivers’ (2013) 66 Computers and 
Industrial Engineering 533. See also Sam Sarpong, ‘Traceability and Supply Chain 
Complexity: Confronting the Issues and Concerns’ (2014) 26 European Business Review 271. 
18 Peter Lund-Thomsen et al, ‘Labour in Global Value Chains: Work Conditions in Football 
Manufacturing in China, India and Pakistan’ (2012) 43 Development and Change 1211, cited 
in International Labour Office, Decent Work in Global Supply Chains, Report IV, International 
Labour Conference, 105th Session 2016 (2016) 7 <http://www.ilo.org/ilc/ILCSessions/ 
105/reports/reports-to-the-conference/WCMS_468097/lang--en/index.htm>.  
19 Kevin Kolben, ‘Transnational Labor Regulation and the Limits of Governance’ (2011) 12 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 403, 407. 
20 UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, The UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights: An Introduction (undated) <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ 
Issues/Business/Intro_Guiding_PrinciplesBusinessHR.pdf> cited in Chilton and Sarfaty, above 
n 1, 8; Susan Marks, ‘Empire’s Law’ (2003) 10(1) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 
449, 461. 
21 Steven R Ratner, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’ (2001) 
111 Yale Law Journal 443, 460, 463 cited in Chilton and Sarfaty, above n 1, 8. 
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and regulatory gaps22 and corruption, and human rights violations.23 These 
problems are not necessarily resolved by the efforts of international or 
intergovernmental institutions because their regulatory capacities are limited.  
Affected workers are left without adequate legal or regulatory protection. 
According to the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre in 2017,24 up to 
94 per cent of the global workforce of 50 major corporations was hidden 
because responsibility had been outsourced multiple times. Workers were 
thereby placed in a vulnerable situation, facing ‘weak legal frameworks that fail 
to protect and uphold labour standards; business operations driven by the search 
for ever lower labour costs; and the increasingly complex nature of supply 
chains’.25 Suppliers, especially those operating informally, may respond to 
price or competition pressures by adopting employment arrangements which 
may not comply with labour regulations, and which may include forced and 
child labour.26  
III EXAMPLES OF SUPPLY CHAIN HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROBLEMS  
Global supply chains have brought with them some benefits, such as 
employment and economic growth, to developing economies. However, such 
chains are also frequently linked to ‘exploitative employment relations, 
environmental irresponsibility and recurrent ethical dilemmas’.27 According to 
the International Trade Union Confederation, in 2016 60 per cent of global trade 
was driven by big business which used a model based on exploitation and abuse 
                                                 
22 Sarfaty, above n 13, 433. 
23 OECD, Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones (2006) 
cited in Chilton and Sarfaty, above n 1, 8. 
24 The Business and Human Rights Resource Centre is a charitable organisation that assists 
communities and NGOs in their work of seeking to get companies to address human rights 
concerns by providing guidance and research analysis as well as advocacy. See further at 
˂https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/about-us˃.  
25 Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (‘BHRRC’), Modern Slavery in Company 
Operation and Supply Chains: Mandatory Transparency, Mandatory Due Diligence and Public 
Procurement Due Diligence (September 2017) <http://www.l20argentina.org/pdf/modern_ 
slavery_in_company_operation_and_supply_chain_final.pdf> 2. 
26 International Labour Office, Decent Work in Global Supply Chains, Report IV, International 
Labour Conference, 105th Session 2016, 3 <http://www.ilo.org/ilc/ILCSessions/105/ 
reports/reports-to-the-conference/WCMS_468097/lang--en/index.htm>. 
27 Clarke and Boersma, above n 16, 111. 
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of human rights in supply chains.28 Commentators have detailed many 
examples of human rights abuses, labour exploitation and other wrongs 
committed in the context of supply chains. Human Rights Watch,29 for 
example, documents: poor working conditions, including minimum wage 
violations; forced overtime; child labour; sexual harassment; exposure to toxic 
substances and other extreme occupational hazards; and retaliation against 
workers who attempt to organise.30 In the five years up to 2017, 89 million 
people experienced some form of modern slavery globally, 82.7 million of 
whom were victims of forced labour, including trafficking. Modern slavery 
accounts for US $150 billion of illicit profits in corporate supply chains across 
the world.31   
Duhigg and Barboza provide evidence of bleak working conditions throughout 
much of the electronics supply chain in Asia,32 and Clarke and Boersma 
identify Apple Inc (Apple) as providing a classic example of the problems that 
emerge in global value chains. Apple’s efforts to eradicate problems and 
enforce higher standards in all of its suppliers have too often failed. When it 
was using supplies from China, where labour laws are weak and there are no 
enforcement procedures, Apple tried to fill the governance gap through private 
initiatives, including the creation in 2006 of a supplier code of conduct designed 
to achieve supplier responsibility. In its 2010 annual Supplier Responsibility 
Report the company stated that it ‘continues to improve and expand our supplier 
responsibility program to ensure that working conditions in our supply base are 
safe, workers are treated with respect and dignity, and manufacturing processes 
are environmentally responsible’.33 Yet despite Apple’s efforts to ensure 
adherence to its Code, and the help it has enlisted from an independent auditor, 
since 2006 the company has continued to be criticised ‘for sourcing 
                                                 
28 International Trade Union Confederation, Scandal: Inside the Global Supply Chains of 50 Top 
Companies (2016) 4 <https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/pdffrontlines_scandal_en-2.pdf>.  
29 Human Rights Watch is an NGO providing research and advocacy on human rights issues. See 
further ˂https://www.hrw.org/about˃. 
30 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in Supply Chains: A Call for a Binding Global Standard 
on Due Diligence (30 May 2016) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/05/30/human-rights-
supply-chains/call-binding-global-standard-due-diligence>.  
31 8.7 Alliance, 2017 Global Estimates: Modern Slavery and Child Labour (2017) ˂https://www. 
alliance87.org/2017ge/#!section=0˃. 
32 Charles Duhigg and David Barboza, ‘In China, Human Costs Are Built into an iPad’, New 
York Times (online) 25 Jan 2012 <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/ieconomy-
apples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-for-workers-in-china.html>; David Barboza and Charles 
Duhigg., ‘China Plant Again Faces Labor Issues on iPhones’, New York Times (online), 10 
September 2012 ˂https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/technology/foxconn-said-to-use-
forced-student-labor-to-make-iphones.html˃.  
33 Apple, 2010 Supplier Responsibility Progress Report (2010) 24 <https://www.apple.com/ 
supplier-responsibility/pdf/Apple_SR_2010_Progress_Report.pdf>. 
150 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 23 
components from producers that have a poor reputation with regard to 
employment conditions and practices’.34 Apple may have been encouraged in 
its lapses by the fact that its customers continued to purchase its products 
regardless of its supply chain faults, generating record profits for the 
company.35 The efforts of stakeholders, media investigations, and independent 
audits had exposed the exploitation in Apple’s supply chain36 but the awareness 
was not sufficient to energise consumers to challenge Apple. Rather, they 
appear to have been satisfied by Apple and one of its suppliers, Foxconn’s, 
‘immense marketing efforts focused on the products themselves’ and so 
exploitative practices continued.37  
IV INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL REGULATORY 
RESPONSES — TOWARDS A REQUIREMENT FOR 
DISCLOSURE AND DUE DILIGENCE 
Recognising these problems, a number of international organisations have 
sought to guide corporate behaviour through the introduction of standards and 
principles. National legislatures have acted to supplement those international 
efforts. This section provides an overview of these measures.   
A United Nations 
In June 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) 
unanimously endorsed 31 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights (UNGPs)38 based on the UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, 
approved in 200839 and supporting the human rights enshrined within the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights40 and the principles concerning 
                                                 
34 Clarke and Boersma, above n 16, 117. 
35 Ibid 125. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid 130. 
38 United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights (2011) <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications 
/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf>. 
39 The ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework developed by the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General on Human Rights and Business was endorsed by UN member states in 
the UN Human Rights Council Resolution on the Mandate of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises (UN Human Rights Council, 2008).  
40 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen 
mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948). 
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fundamental rights in the eight International Labour Organization (ILO) core 
conventions41 as set out in the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work.42  
UNGP 13 states that businesses should ‘avoid causing or contributing to 
adverse human rights impacts through their own activities and address such 
impacts when they occur’ and ‘seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights 
impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services by their 
business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts’. 
UNGP 15 states that business enterprises should have in place ‘[a] policy 
commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human rights’; ‘[a] human 
rights due diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how 
they address their impacts on human rights’; and ‘[p]rocesses to enable the 
remediation of any adverse human rights impacts they cause or to which they 
contribute’.  
These are supplemented by the ILO’s Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour 
Convention of 1930 (No 29)43 with a Supplementary Recommendation Forced 
Labour (Supplementary Measures) Recommendation, 2014 (No 203)44 (aiming 
for 50 ratifications by the end of 2018);45 and the Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (the MNE 
Declaration).46  
The UN Global Compact,47 a voluntary initiative of the UN, encourages 
businesses to adopt sustainable and socially responsible policies, and lays down 
ten principles in the areas of human rights, labour, the environment and anti-
corruption. In particular, businesses should: support and respect the protection 
of internationally proclaimed human rights (Principle 1); ensure that they are 
                                                 
41 Collected in International Labour Office, The International Labour Organization’s 
Fundamental Conventions (2002/3) <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/ 
@declaration/documents/publication/wcms_095895.pdf>. 
42 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, International Labour Conference, 
Geneva, 86th sess (18 June 1998) (Annex revised 15 June 2010). 
43 Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No 29), opened for signature 11 
June 2014, Geneva 103rd ILC Session, 11 June 2014 (entered into force 9 November 2016).  
44 International Labour Organization, Recommendation on Supplementary Measures for the 
Effective Suppression of Forced Labour, 2014 (No 203), adopted 103rd ILC sess, Geneva (11 
Jun 2014). 
45 By October 2018 there were 27 ratifications. 
46 Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 
International Labour Organization, 204th sess, Geneva (November 1977) (last amended March 
2017).  
47 United Nations Global Compact <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/about>. 
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not complicit in human rights abuses (Principle 2); uphold the freedom of 
association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining 
(Principle 3); eliminate all forms of forced and compulsory labour (Principle 
4); effectively abolish child labour (Principle 5), and; eliminate discrimination 
in respect of employment and occupation (Principle 6).  
B OECD  
The OECD has developed in its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,48 a 
set of non-binding recommendations addressed by governments to 
multinational enterprises, aimed at promoting responsible business conduct in 
a global context. It is designed to be consistent with applicable laws and 
internationally recognised standards. These Guidelines were revised in 2011 to 
take into account the UNGPs, the revisions introducing standards on human 
rights, due diligence and supply chain responsibility. They contain a dispute 
resolution process in which interested parties (including non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and trade unions) may make complaints against 
companies to a National Contact Point (NCP) — a body set up by governments 
to further the effectiveness of the Guidelines49 — who will resolve the dispute. 
Thus, whilst they are non-binding, the Guidelines have a hybrid status, 
requiring NCPs to further their effect.50 Since 2000, NCPs have received more 
than 400 cases relating to company operations in over 100 countries and 
territories. The majority of cases deal with: employment and worker issues (54 
per cent), human rights (28 per cent) and environment (20 per cent). Between 
2011 and 2016, approximately half of all cases (47 per cent) which were 
accepted for further examination by NCPs resulted in some form of agreement 
between the parties; and approximately 37 per cent resulted in an internal policy 
change by the company in question.51  
Additional guidance documents have been published by the OECD, such as the 
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals 
                                                 
48 OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, Annex: 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 1976, last revised in 2011 <https://www.oecd.org 
/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf>. 
49 See OECD, National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(2018) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/ncps.htm>. 
50 Sander van’t Foort, ‘The History of National Contact Points and the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises’ [2017] Journal of the Max Planck Institute for European Legal 
History 195. 
51 OECD, Cases Handled by the National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (undated) <http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/Flyer-OECD-National-
Contact-Points.pdf>. 
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from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas in 2011,52 the third edition of 
which was published in 2016, and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for 
Responsible Supply Chains in the Garment and Footwear Sectors in 2017.53 
Similarly, the OECD, together with the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 
published Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains in 2016.54 The 
OECD has recently published general due diligence guidance for responsible 
business conduct, addressed to multinational enterprises and groups, to 
complement the existing Guidelines and sector-specific due diligence 
guidance.55    
C EU 
At the European level the Non-Financial Reporting Directive,56 making 
reference to the OECD Guidelines and the UNGPs, introduced a requirement 
for certain large undertakings (public interest entities) to include in their 
management reports a non-financial statement providing information on  
environmental matters, social and employee-related matters, respect for 
human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters. Such statement should 
include a description of the policies, outcomes and risks related to those 
matters and should be included in the management report of the undertaking 
concerned. The non-financial statement should also include information on 
the due diligence processes implemented by the undertaking, also regarding, 
where relevant and proportionate, its supply and subcontracting chains, in 
order to identify, prevent and mitigate existing and potential adverse 
impacts.57  
                                                 
52 OECD, Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-
Affected and High-Risk Areas <http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/mining.htm>.  
53 OECD, Due Diligence Guidance for  Responsible Supply Chains in the Garment and Footwear 
Sector (2017) <https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/oecd-due-diligence-guidance-garment-
footwear.pdf>.  
54 OECD-FAO, Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains (14 October 2016) 
<https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/agriculture-and-food/oecd-fao-guidance-for-responsible-
agricultural-supply-chains_9789264251052-en>.  
55 See OECD, Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct (31 May 2018) 
<http://www.oecd.org/investment/due-diligence-guidance-for-responsible-business-conduct. 
htm>.  
56 Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 
amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity 
Information by Certain Large Undertakings and Groups [2014] OJ L 330/1, 1–9. 
57 Ibid, Preamble, para 6. 
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The statement might also include information on the prevention of human rights 
abuses and on measures taken to prevent bribery or corruption.58   
As well as the EU’s Non-Financial Reporting Directive, the EU Regulation 
2017/82159 was introduced, applicable since January 2017, which establishes 
obligations related to management systems, risk management, and independent 
third-party audits for importers of conflict minerals.60 Such importers must 
prepare annual reports on the steps taken to implement those obligations as well 
as their due diligence policies and practices for responsible sourcing, and they 
must make available to their governments third party audit reports or evidence 
of conformity with a supply chain due diligence scheme. The European 
Parliament has introduced a ‘flagship initiative’ calling for similar due 
diligence requirements in the garment sector.61 In addition, an EU ‘green card 
initiative’62 proposes that EU-based companies operate under a duty of care 
towards individuals and local communities whose human rights or local 
environment are affected by corporate activities, and Motion 2015/258963 
requests the European Council to consider new EU legislation to create a legal 
obligation of due diligence to require EU companies outsourcing to third 
countries to pursue measures to secure traceability and transparency. The 
European Parliament also passed a resolution in September 2017 responding to 
motion 2015/2589 — 2016/2301 (INI) — on the impact of international trade 
and the EU’s trade policies on global value chains. The resolution, among other 
things, called on the Commission to work on the development of due diligence 
requirements.64   
                                                 
58 See also art 1(1) and 1(3) of Directive 2014/95/EU. 
59 Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 
laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and 
tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. 
60 Conflict minerals are defined by the OECD as minerals or metals from conflict-affected and 
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D National Measures 
National measures take the form either of disclosure requirements or of due 
diligence requirements. For disclosure-oriented transparency the most widely 
publicised developments include the California Transparency in Supply Chains 
Act 2010 and the UK’s Modern Slavery Act 2015.  
The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act 2010 (now included in the 
California Civil Code) requires website disclosure of any actions taken to 
eradicate slavery and human trafficking from a corporation’s direct supply 
chain for tangible goods offered for sale. The company must disclose on its 
website to ‘what extent, if any’ it:  
(1) Engages in verification of product supply chains to evaluate and address 
risks of human trafficking and slavery. The disclosure shall specify if the 
verification was not conducted by a third party.  
(2) Conducts audits of suppliers to evaluate supplier compliance with 
company standards for trafficking and slavery in supply chains. The 
disclosure shall specify if the verification was not an independent, 
unannounced audit.  
(3) Requires direct suppliers to certify that materials incorporated into the 
product comply with the laws regarding slavery and human trafficking of the 
country or countries in which they are doing business.  
(4) Maintains internal accountability standards and procedures for employees 
or contractors failing to meet company standards regarding slavery and 
trafficking.  
(5) Provides company employees and management, who have direct 
responsibility for supply chain management, training on human trafficking 
and slavery, particularly with respect to mitigating risks within the supply 
chains of products.65 
A company may comply with the law by posting only one statement ever, since 
the Act does not specify how frequently a statement must be made.66 The 
California Attorney-General has exclusive authority to enforce the legislation, 
leading a civil action for injunctive relief. Companies do not face a monetary 
penalty for failure to disclose, but the Attorney-General may order them to take 
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65 Cal Civ Code § 1714.43(c). 
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specific action. Citizens have no private right of action under the Act. A federal 
US Business Transparency in Trafficking and Slavery Bill67 targets all 
businesses with revenues above US $100 million and, if enacted, will require 
them to describe in their annual reports how they assess and address slavery in 
their supply chains.68  
In the UK, section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (Modern Slavery Act) 
requires any commercial organisation which supplies goods or services, carries 
on a business or part of a business in the UK, and whose annual turnover is not 
less than £36 million to produce a slavery and human trafficking statement for 
each financial year. The report must provide details of what the organisation is 
doing to ‘ensure that slavery and human trafficking is not taking place in any 
of its supply chains, and in any part of its own business’. Section 54(5) contains 
a non-exhaustive list of the issues that the statement ‘may’ cover: ‘the 
organisation’s structure, its business and its supply chains’; ‘its policies in 
relation to slavery and human trafficking’; ‘its due diligence processes in 
relation to slavery and human trafficking in its business and supply chains’; ‘the 
parts of its business and supply chains where there is a risk of slavery and 
human trafficking taking place, and the steps it has taken to assess and manage 
that risk’; ‘its effectiveness in ensuring that slavery and human trafficking is 
not taking place in its business or supply chains, measured against such 
performance indicators as it considers appropriate’; and ‘the training about 
slavery and human trafficking available to its staff’. If a company fails to 
produce a slavery and human trafficking statement for a particular financial 
year the UK Secretary of State may seek an injunction from the High Court 
requiring the organisation to comply.69 Some have suggested that this would be 
‘an unlikely course of action’70 though failure to comply with any such 
injunction would put the company in contempt of a court order, punishable by 
an unlimited fine.  
Neither of these disclosure laws is especially strong. Neither law requires 
companies to report on the extent of modern slavery in their operations or 
supply chains, nor do they require companies to take steps to prevent slavery in 
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their operations or supply chains.71 Companies have no need to report or to 
implement robust due diligence processes.72  
Unsurprisingly, the Modern Slavery Act has not led to full and effective 
disclosure by corporations. In 2016, the Business and Human Rights Resource 
Centre found that only 15 of 27 statements analysed (56 per cent) complied 
with the minimum requirements. Its analysis showed ‘patchy compliance with 
the substantive provisions of the Act’.73 Only a small number of the 27 FTSE 
100 companies analysed provided information on risks they identified in their 
operations and supply chains and explained how they addressed them. Most 
companies provided little information on the structure and complexity of their 
supply chains. Only two companies reported developing performance 
indicators.74 A subsequent briefing released in June 2017 by CORE Coalition 
revealed that only around 14 per cent of over 2100 statements under the Act 
comply with the minimum requirements and most of those provide little 
information on the six areas the Act suggests that companies report on.75 
According to a 2016 review by Ergon Associates of 230 Modern Slavery Act 
company statements, most fail to comply with minimum requirements. Forty 
per cent had not been signed by a director, and about 30 per cent were not 
accessible via a link easily found on the company’s website.76 Ergon’s review 
also noted poor reporting on key performance indicators, and that 35 per cent 
of statements ‘say nothing on the question of their risk assessment processes’.77 
In light of the recognised weaknesses, a private members bill was introduced in 
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the House of Lords in 2017 seeking to amend section 54(5) of the Act78 to make 
the suggested transparency statement mandatory, and to require an organisation 
that declares it has taken no steps to eradicate slavery and human trafficking 
from its supply chain and business to explain its reasons for not doing so.  
Going further than the steps taken in California and the UK, some states have 
adopted due diligence laws. These require a company to go beyond simply 
making statements about its policies for dealing with risks of human rights 
abuses or environmental damage and to demonstrate that it is taking measures 
to prevent or mitigate any negative impacts.79 Due diligence is defined by the 
UN and the OECD as a risk-based process ‘through which enterprises can 
identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their actual and 
potential adverse impacts’. The OECD Guidance on Due Diligence for 
Responsible Business Conduct recommends a six-step framework which 
includes 1) embedding responsible business conduct into policies and 
management systems; 2) identifying and assessing adverse impacts in 
operations, supply chains and business relationships; 3) ceasing, preventing or 
mitigating adverse impacts; 4; tracking implementation and results; 5) 
communicating how impacts are addressed; and 6) providing for or cooperating 
in mediation when appropriate.80  
France recently introduced Law 2017-39981 on the corporate duty of care owed 
by parent and subcontracting companies. Under this law, companies have 
reporting obligations and they must implement a due diligence plan (plan de 
vigilance) and exercise ‘reasonable vigilance’ to make sure the plan is 
implemented.82 The plan will describe, annually, the company’s oversight 
mechanisms for identifying and mitigating any violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, severe bodily or environmental damage, or health risks 
resulting from the company’s activities or the activities of companies it controls 
or any of its subcontractors or suppliers.83 The French law does not require that 
slavery or trafficking be eradicated, but that companies engage in oversight.84  
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The Netherlands is currently in the process of legislating for a duty of care to 
prevent child labour. The relevant Act would be the Wet zorgplicht 
kinderarbeid. Under the proposed legislation, companies selling or delivering 
products or services to Dutch end users would be required to investigate and 
identify whether there is a reasonable suspicion that child labour is contributing 
to their delivering or selling of goods or services in their chain. If such a 
suspicion arose, a company would have to develop a plan of action to address 
it and issue a due diligence statement. A supervising authority would be 
appointed to monitor compliance with the Act. The statement would be 
recorded in a public register, which would also be held by the supervising 
authority, thought likely to be the Dutch Authority on Consumers and 
Markets.85 This law, if passed, would provide that any stakeholder who has 
clear evidence that a company has used child labour to produce goods or 
services would be able to submit a complaint to that company. If the company 
did not resolve the complaint satisfactorily with the stakeholder within six 
months, the stakeholder would then be able to submit the complaint to Dutch 
authorities, who might issue a legally-binding instruction ordering the company 
to conduct the required due diligence and make the appropriate declaration. A 
failure by the company to comply with the instruction would result in a fine of 
up to EUR 820 000 or, alternatively, 10 per cent of the company’s annual 
turnover, and two or more failures within five years might lead to criminal 
penalties and more substantial fines. The companies that would be covered by 
the legislation include not only companies that are registered with the Dutch 
trade register but also foreign companies if they deliver goods or services to 
end-users in the Netherlands more than once a year.86 At the time of writing, 
the law awaits approval by the Dutch Senate although its future status is 
unclear. 
Switzerland is also working towards a potential article 101(a) in the Federal 
Constitution concerning the responsibility of business. Its goal would be to 
oblige Swiss companies to incorporate respect for human rights and the 
environment in all their activities. If enacted, this new constitutional provision 
would have extraterritorial effect by applying also to Swiss-based companies’ 
activities abroad. Under the proposal, companies would be required to carry out 
appropriate due diligence. Companies would also be liable for damage caused 
by companies under their control where these latter companies have, in the 
course of business, committed violations of internationally recognised human 
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rights or international environmental standards. They would not be liable, 
however, if they could prove that they took all due care to avoid the loss or 
damage, or that the damage would have occurred even if all due care had been 
taken.87  
This ‘Responsible Business Initiative’ (RBI) is a popular initiative brought by 
a coalition led by NGOs, including Greenpeace and Amnesty International, and 
is supported by 85 organisations working in international aid, women’s and 
human rights and environmental protection, as well as churches, unions and 
shareholders’ associations. In Switzerland, most popular initiatives do not 
achieve the required formal approval to become law. However, even if 
unsuccessful, a popular initiative may still shape the political landscape by 
generating public debate, highlighting specific issues and putting pressure on 
politicians.88 On 14 June 2018, the Swiss National Council approved a counter-
proposal to the citizen RBI by a majority of 121 votes in favour (73 against). 
The counter-proposal establishes human rights obligations for Swiss companies 
with respect to their overseas impacts, as well as civil liability for parent 
companies for the harm caused by entities under their control. The National 
Council’s counter-proposal represents a compromise between the views of the 
RBI’s proponents, the Parliament and the business community. As a 
compromise, the counter-proposal is not as far-reaching as the RBI in that it 
applies to large companies and the civil liability provisions are more restrictive. 
If this counter-proposal is accepted by the Council of State and adopted, the 
RBI will be withdrawn.89 
It is perhaps too early to judge the above due diligence provisions because the 
French law is very recent, and the Netherlands and Swiss provisions are still 
going through the development processes and may not materialise as full laws. 
In any event, whilst due diligence is an advance, such an approach does not 
guarantee the prevention of negative impacts. Thus, for example, the French 
Law does not require eradication of slavery or trafficking, but rather that 
companies make efforts to eradicate or reduce those risks and be able to 
demonstrate such efforts. 
                                                 
87 Swiss Coalition for Corporate Justice, The Initiative Text with Explanations (undated) 
<http://konzern-initiative.ch/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/The-initiative-text-with-explanat 
ions.pdf>.  
88 Julianne Hughes-Jennett et al, ‘Switzerland: The Next Frontier for Mandatory Human Rights 
Due Diligence?’ Hogan Lovell (1 December 2017) <https://www.hlregulation.com/ 
2017/12/01/switzerland-the-next-frontier-for-mandatory-human-rights-due-diligence/>. 
89 Swiss Coalition for Corporate Justice, ‘Another Step towards the Adoption of a Mandatory 
HRDD Bill in Switzerland’ (16 June 2018) <http://corporatejustice.org/news/7046-another-
step-towards-the-adoption-of-a-mandatory-hrdd-bill-in-switzerland>. 
2018 THE LIMITS OF DISCLOSURE IN REGULATING GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 161 
Overall, the most established legislation is perhaps the Modern Slavery Act but 
unfortunately the impact results do not give cause for celebration. The Modern 
Slavery Index of 2017,90 which assessed 198 countries on the strength of their 
laws, the effectiveness of their enforcement and the severity of violations, 
reported an increased risk of slavery in 20 EU countries and across the world, 
as the current migration crisis increases the possibility of human trafficking and 
forced labour.91 The Global Estimates of Modern Slavery Report, published by 
Alliance 8.7,92 found that in 2016 across the globe there were an estimated 40.3 
million men, women and children who were victims of slavery, 24.9 million of 
these being in forced labour, including 16 million in forced labour in the private 
sector, 4.1 million in state labour and 4.8 million in forced sexual exploitation.93 
According to the ITUC’s Global Rights Index 2017,94 the number of countries 
experiencing physical violence and threats against workers rose by ten per cent 
in the previous year, with corporate interests being prioritised and workers 
being denied labour law protections across the global economy.95    
V THE PROBLEMS AND LIMITATIONS OF TRANSPARENCY 
Transparency through disclosure brings with it grand promises of ‘regulation 
by revelation’96: of greater trust, more participation, a more efficient 
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administration97 and less corruption.98 A moral basis for the demand for 
disclosure is the need to ameliorate the impact of corporate activities on 
others.99 By reducing information asymmetries, disclosure may enable weaker 
parties to participate more effectively in this process of amelioration and hold 
the corporate actors to account more easily.100 However, whilst disclosure 
might be regarded as an important mechanism for aligning shareholder and 
management interests101 it could inadvertently downplay the effects of bad 
behaviour or provide a reputational advantage without actually changing 
behaviours substantively.102  
Disclosure regulation is based on an ‘assumption that information matters and 
information can empower’.103 However, such empowerment depends on the 
information being valuable, accessible, comprehensible and comparable.104 Yet 
difficulties stand in the way of effective and empowering disclosure regulation, 
including the proliferation of measures that may compete with or contradict 
each other, the commodification of information, power reinforcement, 
information overload and the lack of enforcement or remediation.  
A Proliferation of Measures 
The multiplicity of measures aimed at effecting transparency contributes to 
inconsistencies and lack of coherence. This has been the experience in 
environmental reporting where multiple frameworks, and tension between the 
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corporate and stakeholder objectives have ‘produced a number of governance 
systems that might be applied simultaneously and to different effect and for 
different constituencies’.105 As Backer observes, ‘In the aggregate, these 
transparency systems are incoherent, making miscommunication likely and 
assessment across systems difficult’.106  
B Marketisation 
Emphasis on business case arguments for disclosure has turned the processes 
into a means for corporations to secure market leadership107 rather than to 
reduce the problems that their activities bring about. Disclosure has therefore 
become increasingly marketised or commodified108 with the result that 
disclosure systems often compete with, and are shaped by, investor and 
consumer tastes rather than by science and policy.109 Mol, for example, notes 
that new intermediaries/powerbrokers facilitate, translate, certify, interpret and 
articulate information in order to make it available and useful for different 
categories inside and outside value chains and networks.110  
C Power 
In supply chains lead companies seize power over the actors further down the 
supply chain not just in their production processes but also in the disclosures 
made.111 Lead firms have the ability to ‘drive coordination, enforce agreements, 
transmit environmental and human rights norms, and conduct due diligence 
along their supply chains’.112 For example, Backer observes that Walmart has 
managed to control the flow and coordination of supplier information, and the 
presence of clear, strict supplier standards allows Walmart to present practice 
failures along its supply chain as failures at the supplier and not the distributor 
level.113 Sometimes, however, the suppliers may have power over the buyer 
firms, such as when the buyer or lead firm faces high switching costs or lacks 
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the purchasing power to hold its suppliers captive. In such circumstances the 
lead firm has greater difficulty exercising due diligence, being forced to tolerate 
non-compliant and opportunistic behaviour by suppliers, especially those 
located at a distance from the lead firm.114  
D The Recipients of Information 
Cooper and Owen observe that corporate disclosures offer organisational 
stakeholders little opportunity for facilitating action and therefore do not give 
rise to accountability.115 With respect to the human rights interests of 
consumers, for example, the disclosures made are not always sufficient to 
enable consumers to identify which companies are making comprehensive 
efforts to protect human rights and which are not.116 Nor are consumers able to 
determine from the information given to them the extent of human rights abuses 
in supply chain processes. Consumers also face information overload or ‘data 
fog’,117 being swamped by too many or too technically complex disclosures.118 
They become further disempowered.119  
E Lack of Enforceability 
The UN initiatives have been very important in establishing a business and 
human rights agenda but they have been criticised by major NGOs and 
academics for their non-binding status as well as their lack of reference to issues 
such as extraterritorial adjudication, and the absence of a central mechanism to 
ensure their universal implementation.120 Positive claims made by the OECD 
about its dispute process are also contested by critics who regard the process as 
‘no longer fit for purpose’. For example, in the UK, Amnesty International UK 
exposes the OECD Guidelines as a system that lets companies off the hook 
when human rights abuses are alleged against them.121 Similarly, OECD Watch 
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states that ‘far too many complaints are rejected outright, and of those accepted, 
the vast majority do not result in outcomes that end corporate misconduct, 
provide victims with remedies for harms incurred, or bring about changes to 
corporate behaviour’.122  
In light of these weaknesses it is no wonder that commentators conclude, as 
does Mol, that ‘transparency-in-practice has many shortcomings, practical 
limitations, dysfunctionalities or pathologies’.123 The limitations exposed by 
such commentators are manifested also by the fact that they appear to have been 
ineffective in reducing the number of those experiencing exploitation. We still 
witness human rights abuses, environmental damage, and labour exploitation. 
The ITUC Secretary General remarks on a hidden workforce, with states and 
corporations refusing to take responsibility, the result being that fundamental 
rights are undermined by corporate interests.124    
VI SOME SOLUTIONS 
What must be done to make the regulation of multinational companies and 
supply chains more effective? Commentators point out that effective 
approaches to human rights issues in global supply chains are characterised by 
companies engaging with a broad range of stakeholders.  
Of relevance are the power relationships that occur in supply chains. The 
Institute for Global Law and Policy (IGLP) recognises that ‘law constitutes the 
power relations between actors that give rise to particular forms of governance 
and engender particular distributive effects’. The IGLP tells us that 
[t]his focus on the role that legal frameworks play at different levels of a 
particular chain, and on the politico-economic power dynamics that operate 
behind competing legal norms, can help facilitate a critical assessment of the 
structural and distributional dimensions of GVCs — and the global economy 
more broadly — that are often taken for granted or normalised. Such an 
imaginative legal exercise can then help to elucidate alternative and 
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potentially more progressive sites of intervention by scholars, policymakers 
and civil society groups.125 
From this perspective, it becomes important to examine what is really going on 
in these supply chains. It is easy to overlook the exploitative behaviours that 
permeate many of these structures which are described as global supply chains 
or global value chains. 
Selwyn argues that a reformulation of ‘global value chains’ as ‘global poverty 
chains’ provides a concept that better comprehends the global dynamics of 
wealth concentration, and the (re)production of poverty and inequality.126 The 
term ‘global value chain’ shows how lead firm chain governance impacts upon 
supplier firm upgrading strategies and illuminates effectively how corporate 
decisions and practices in one part of the world impact upon developmental 
processes in another part of the world. However, it contains developmental bias 
since the supplier firm is presented as ‘upgrading’ its procedures to provide a 
route to poverty reduction and development.127 In these global value chain 
structures, Selwyn tells us, lead firm monopolistic, value-capturing and profit-
maximising strategies are combined with exploitative supplier-firm strategies 
of capital accumulation to provide employment with deleterious effects upon 
workers, including poverty pay and unfree labour.128 As Andrew Crane 
explains, ‘value distribution along the supply chain, insofar as a particular stage 
is associated with very low-value capture, can provide significant pressure 
towards slavery’.129 Thus, rather than seeing global value chains as 
developmental organisations that raise people from poverty, the capitalist 
exploitation of labour within these structures ‘immiserates’ those working for 
them and keeps them in  poverty. The Schumpeterian search by firms for new 
technologies, new markets, new sources of supply and new ways of making 
things may have the goal of improving supplier firm efficiency, 
competitiveness, adaptability and ability to link up to dynamic lead firms in 
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‘value-adding’ ways,130 but it is also driven by profit-maximisation leading to 
cost cutting and attempts to reap greater value and productivity from the 
workers by exploiting their labour. This might be seen as another example of 
the global south effectively subsidising the wealth of the global north, as was 
recently argued by Hickel in his book The Divide.131 In short, Selwyn tells us 
that these chains effectively reinforce poverty through exploitative 
arrangements:  
First, lead firms use their oligopoly power to capture the Lion’s share of the 
value created in each chain. Second, employment in these industries does not 
represent ‘the first rung on the ladder out of extreme poverty’, but, on the 
contrary, generates new forms of poverty. Third, lead firms play a significant 
part in generating these poverty-inducing conditions which in turn enables 
them to capture the majority share of value created in these chains.132  
The formation and expansion of super-exploited labouring classes across 
developing countries in the global south facilitates northern firm accumulation 
strategies. The latter firms can threaten ‘their’ workers with outsourcing in 
order to repress wages, lengthen the working day, and intensify work. The 
production of very cheap goods by super-exploited workers across the global 
south enables northern workers to maintain relatively high levels of 
consumption whilst experiencing stagnant/falling wages.133 Thus, the impact is 
felt by workers in both the global south and the global north, since the poverty 
wages paid to those in the south lead to a driving down of wages in the north 
too as a result of the offshoring.134  
A Exploitation 
These global poverty chains are coordinated by powerful, multinational lead 
firms that source high quality goods and services at the lowest cost. Thus, 
through their own profit-seeking behaviour, they exploit the workers at the base 
of their value chains.135 Such firms operate by externalising the responsibilities 
for the production process and for how the workers are treated. At the same 
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time, they use their powerful position to keep the production costs low and to 
maximise their profits. Clarke and Boersma’s case study of Apple provides an 
example of this dynamic. The authors highlight how Apple externalises its 
responsibilities through its Supplier Code of Conduct and therein demands that  
suppliers … provide safe working conditions, treat workers with dignity and 
respect, act fairly and ethically, and use environmentally responsible 
practices wherever they make products or perform services for Apple .... 
Apple will assess its suppliers’ compliance with this Code, and any violations 
of this Code may jeopardize the supplier’s business relationship with Apple, 
up to and including termination.136  
Alongside this Code of Conduct requirement, Apple demands from its suppliers 
high quality goods and services at the lowest prices possible. The supplier is 
therefore left with little choice but to cut its own production costs and to pass 
those on by paying lower wages to the workers and leaving them to work in 
unsafe production facilities. The externalising of responsibilities is pushed onto 
those who have no way to externalise them further, and those are the workers 
who have little labour law protection and who are forbidden to form 
independent trade unions or to strike, as is the case for the workers in Apple’s 
Chinese suppliers.137   
This exploitative form of organisation is an essential feature of these production 
chains. The recognition of this exploitation might encourage adoption of an 
alternative approach, analytically prioritising workers’ attempts to ameliorate 
their conditions.138 Selwyn compares a social upgrading analysis with an 
analysis of the labour process and concludes:  
While advocates of social upgrading and Decent Work represent a ‘top-
down’ approach to addressing problems of labour’s mal-treatment by capital, 
a more critical chain/network framework, rooted in an analysis of the labour 
process, represents a ‘bottom-up’ approach to these issues. The first 
perspective allocates labour a subordinate ‘partnership’ role to capital’s profit 
orientation and states’ attempts at regulating the capital–labour relation. The 
second perspective analytically prioritizes workers’ struggles to ameliorate 
their conditions through collective action.139  
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Selwyn’s alternative approach is much more likely to result in an emancipatory 
agenda than the top-down approach, which has enabled the lead companies in 
supply chains to retain their power and has resulted in weak disclosure 
provisions that have given little participatory opportunity to the affected 
stakeholders. In addition, if we change the terminology to refer to ‘exploitation’ 
or ‘poverty’ chains, this calls up the need for the lead companies as well as 
others who participate in the system as producers, consumers or facilitators, to 
accept responsibility in this global system.  
B Responsibility 
A number of models of responsibility are available to us. Thomas Pogge, for 
example, describes arrangements of this nature using a fault- or liability-based 
model and describes ‘the institutions and social processes in which most of the 
world’s people are embedded as a system that is imposed by some on others’.140 
In Pogge’s model there is a small global elite located in resource-rich developed 
countries who ‘enforce a global poverty regime under which [they] may claim 
the world’s natural resources for [themselves] and can distribute these among 
[themselves] on mutually agreeable terms’. This global economic order is 
imposed on people in developing countries by Western governments acting in 
the name of their citizens, dominating those on whom it is imposed and driving 
them into deep poverty.141  
Dahan, Lerner and Milman-Sivan broaden the cohort of those with 
responsibility by positing a set of five principles for allocating responsibility in 
the context of global chains of production. These are:  
1. the principle of connectedness, grounded on special relationships that 
are based on shared identity or on participation in a joint activity;  
2. the capacity principle, relating to the capacity of individuals or 
institutions to prevent and remedy unjust working conditions;   
3. the beneficiary principle, relating to the economic gain that actors — 
MNEs rather than subcontractors — derive from the labour connection 
and from production carried out under unjust conditions;  
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4. the contribution principle, relating to conduct by individuals or 
institutions that is causally related to the unjust working conditions in 
question, such as the conduct of creating unjust labour conditions 
directly or indirectly, by actual actions or omissions;  
5. the control principle, relating to the extent of control that an individual 
or institutional actor such as an MNE maintains over the unjust 
situation and over the conduct of participants such as sub-contractors 
who abuse workers’ rights.142  
Against this set of principles, it is easy to see that lead companies may have 
responsibility attributed to them, but so also would other participants in the 
system, including end consumers under the connectedness, beneficiary and 
contribution principles.   
Young highlights the responsibility that arises from our social connections in 
global justice arrangements. The structural injustices inherent in poverty chains 
is a collective problem. Young presents a ‘social connection model’ of 
responsibility, according to which ‘all agents who contribute by their actions to 
the structural processes that produce injustice have responsibilities to work to 
remedy these injustices’.143 Pointing to the example of sweatshops in global 
supply chains, Young observes that anti-sweatshop activists argue that the 
‘workers at the bottom of this system suffer injustice in the form of domination, 
coercion, and need-deprivation within a global system of vast inequalities’.144  
Young sees this arrangement as a form of structural injustice in which social 
processes put large categories of persons under a systematic threat of 
domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities, 
whilst others may dominate or have a wide range of opportunities for 
developing and exercising their capacities. The injustice occurs as a 
consequence of many individuals and institutions acting in pursuit of their 
particular goals and interests, within given institutional rules and accepted 
norms. All participants in the ongoing schemes of cooperation that constitute 
these global structures are responsible for them, in the sense that they are part 
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of the process that produces unjust outcomes:145 ‘We bear responsibility 
because we are part of the process. Within this scheme of social cooperation, 
each of us expects justice toward ourselves, and others can legitimately make 
claims on us.’146 An example of the power of individuals is the potential of 
consumers and civil society organisations, acting collectively, to achieve social 
and economic change. Clarke and Boersma argue that ‘pressure by civil society 
organisations harnessing consumer power is one of the driving forces behind 
changes in social and environmental practices’.147 This gives rise, according to 
Young, to a political responsibility that is forward-looking and collective and 
demands us to change, through communication and discourse, the institutions 
and processes so that they generate less unjust outcomes.148  
In this model workers share responsibility for combating exploitative 
conditions. This aspect makes the model emancipatory, in principle, because it 
demands that the workers be organised in order to participate in a 
transformative process. However, in reality, especially where freedom to 
organise is not recognised or not enforced, such workers may be able to 
discharge their responsibilities only with the support of others — often faraway 
and relatively privileged others — who make public the workers’ grievances, 
put pressure on the agents that would block their unionisation, and provide 
material aid.149  
Arguably, it is possible to adopt a mixed system of liability-based responsibility 
and collective social-connection responsibility. The liability-based 
responsibility would focus on the exploitative role played by lead corporations 
and the social-connection responsibility would focus on the roles of individuals 
and organisations that participate in ways that support the exploitation or leave 
it unhindered. The responsibility in both senses is to seek to eradicate the 
exploitation and to find systems that reduce or eliminate global inequality and 
poverty and protect against human rights abuses or unsafe work practices.150 
The adoption of a mixed system of responsibility would demand a number of 
changes to the existing body of principles and standards. The UNGPs, for 
example, might be altered to reflect more accurately the moral responsibility of 
lead companies and MNEs/TNCs. Thus, they might be expressed not just in 
terms of a duty to respect human rights but positively, in terms of a duty to 
protect such rights, as states are required to do. The relevant corporations 
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should also be given an express duty to protect and assist potential and actual 
victims of human rights abuses, remedying and compensating if abuses or 
violations occur.151 This duty could be shaped as a duty shared by all 
participants in the global production chains.152 This might require more 
coordinated disclosure provisions. As the BHRRC observes, ‘the successful, 
but disparate, initiatives by governments … if brought together, and applied 
internationally, would form a powerful global force to combat modern 
slavery’.153 The currently uncoordinated actions could  
become a robust, and harmonised international standard for national 
legislations. Acting in concert, governments would have far greater impact 
on modern slavery and workers’ rights and raise the floor of minimum 
corporate behaviour. Acting together, governments would also avoid a 
‘spaghetti soup’ of incoherent legislations, and instead create the 
international predictability that global business seeks.154  
Common regulation would ‘allow better monitoring by workers, trade unions, 
NGOs and investors and, in case of non-compliance, targeted litigation’.155 It 
would allow those participants to make comparisons across companies more 
easily.156 
C Responsibility, Participation and Disclosure 
A joint responsibility approach might also lead to more fundamental changes 
to the required disclosure process. The aim would be for disclosures to be: 1) 
steps towards prevention of labour exploitation or human rights abuses; 2) 
bases for dialogue between corporate actors and workers, consumers and their 
representatives and; 3) part of the apparatus for accountability and/or 
remediation. In order to produce such fundamental changes such disclosures 
would need to inform recipients (including all participants in the chain) of 
details of the whole chain’s structure, the identity and contacts of all participant 
suppliers within the chain as well as their lead personnel, the contractual terms 
and conditions existing between relevant parties, the production processes 
across or throughout the chain, the terms and conditions of workers’ contracts, 
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and the prices and wages paid at all levels. Details of policies should be made 
available to prevent or end human rights abuses, including forced labour, 
human trafficking and breaches of international conventions. Such details 
should show how the policies are being acted upon and the outcomes of such 
actions, including details of where problems of policy implementation may 
have arisen.  
The disclosure and due diligence laws implemented in the UK and in France 
are important steps in this direction. This additional suggestion would require 
participants in all areas of the supply chain to be involved in the continuous 
updating and revision of the available information. External technological 
resources could be developed to enable this ongoing process.157  
The potential for a meaningful and positive participation by consumer and 
worker/trade union networks is illustrated by the example provided by the 
Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety agreed in May 2013, (and 
recently renewed with effect from 1 June 2018). It was formulated in the wake 
of the Rana Plaza collapse. The Accord is an independent, legally binding 
agreement between the owners of signatory brands and trade unions designed 
to work towards a safe and healthy Bangladeshi Ready-Made Garment (RMG) 
Industry. The agreement consists of six key components: a five year legally 
binding agreement between the brand owners and trade unions to ensure a safe 
working environment in the Bangladeshi RMG industry; an independent 
inspection program supported by the brand owners in which workers and trade 
unions are involved; public disclosure of all factories, inspection reports and 
corrective action plans; a commitment by signatory brand owners to ensure that 
sufficient funds are available for remediation and to maintain sourcing 
relationships; democratically elected health and safety committees in all 
factories to identify and act on health and safety risks; and worker 
empowerment through an extensive training program, complaints mechanism 
and the right to refuse unsafe work. Importantly, the signatories to the Accord 
are required to assist in providing the supplier factories with the financial 
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resources necessary for maintaining safe workplaces and to carry out requisite 
structural repairs and safety improvements.158  
The Accord has been described by commentators as a game changer159 and as 
a new paradigm for enforcing labour and human rights.160 It has great potential, 
and indeed its success — the overall progress rate of remediation at the 1620 
Accord-covered factories is 85 per cent161 — has meant that its period of 
operation has been extended. Nevertheless, the Accord still has some 
limitations, such as its failure to lead to changes in buyer practice and also the 
fact that lead companies retain high leverage with regard to funding.162 Yet, 
despite these limitations, the Accord has been considered a major advance and 
its Steering Committee makes no bones about what has made it a successful 
agreement: the labour-corporate partnership at the heart of the agreement, the 
Accord’s recognition of the need to ensure that factory owners are able to afford 
the cost of safety improvements, and the binding nature of the agreement.163 
The Committee comments that  
the Accord continues to be a unique opportunity for factory management, 
workers and their trade unions, global brands and global unions to combine 
their forces and thus remedy the systemic problem of building and fire safety 
deficits that has plagued the Bangladeshi garment industry.164 
Similar to the Bangladeshi Accord, the negotiations currently under way to 
create a binding treaty governing the balance between business interests and 
human rights emphasise the participation of civil society representatives in that 
work.165 Whilst the ongoing work towards this binding treaty are beyond the 
scope of this article, it is worth noting that the current draft text includes 
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provisions that would recognise the participatory relevance of affected 
individuals and communities and their representatives.  
Thus, draft clauses 28–35 of Part II contain commands for transnational 
corporations (TNCs) as follows: 
28. TNCs shall respect the collective processes, associations, organisations, 
movements and other forms of representation communities as legitimate 
interlocutors for dialogue.  
29. TNCs shall provide precise and detailed information to the public on: a. 
the purpose, nature, scale and terms of the leasing contracts for their 
operations and/or other contracts, as well as the terms of those contracts; b. 
the activities, structure, ownership and governance of the TNCs; c. the 
financial situation and performance of the TNCs; d. the availability of 
grievance and redress mechanisms and the procedures for their use.  
30. TNCs shall make public the identity of the partners with whom their 
investors carry out business and/or financial activities in order to prevent tax 
fraud and evasion, or intra-firm capital flows that violate human rights.  
31. TNCs shall make public their corporate management structures, the 
individuals who are responsible for making decisions and their respective 
responsibilities in the supply chain. By doing so, shareholders become liable 
and the corporate veil can be pierced whenever TNCs violate human rights.  
32. TNCs shall disseminate information through all appropriate means (print, 
electronic and social media, including newspapers, radio, television, 
mailings, local meetings etc.), taking into account the situation of remote or 
isolated and non-literate communities, and ensure that notification and 
consultation are carried out in the language(s) of the affected individuals and 
communities.  
33. TNCs shall publish adequate information on the conditions of 
employment of migrant workers throughout their supply chains.  
34. TNCs shall be held liable for any adverse effects on human rights they 
cause or to which they contribute, through dissimulated activities and/or 
complicity, as well as through instigation or inducement. TNCs shall take 
adequate measures for the prevention, mitigation and, where appropriate, 
remediation of such adverse effects.  
35. In the case of the possibility of risks deriving from their operations, TNCs 
shall guarantee the participation of the affected individuals or communities 
in the management of the situation, while ensuring collective 
representativeness. …  
176 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 23 
VII CONCLUSIONS 
The way in which we conceptualise supply chains is important for the potential 
regulatory structure applied to them. Clearly, the history until now has been one 
of ‘persistent corporate impunity’.166 Despite considerable progress with the 
introduction of multiple different initiatives, including development of due 
diligence procedures, serious problems remain. Businesses continue to violate 
human rights with little fear of punishment. 
Ultimately, the main regulatory approach — disclosure — falls short of its goals 
of respecting human rights or furthering sustainable business behaviour. Due 
diligence has the potential to take regulation a step further forward, but it does 
not purport to lead to the eradication of human rights abuses. In this article I 
have followed Benjamin Selwyn’s suggestion of renaming global supply chains 
‘global poverty chains’ or ‘global exploitation chains’. The use of such 
terminology highlights the normative requirements placed on lead firms and 
other participants in the production processes to take both collective and 
liability-based responsibility. The quest for transparency remains of central 
importance, but my suggested plan is to develop a more coordinated disclosure 
process that invites the participation of affected parties as well as the lead firms. 
New technologies open up these possibilities and could facilitate a regulatory 
structure that would also include enforcement procedures and remediation.  
Ultimately, transparency is not by itself a sufficient regulatory strategy to 
remedy what are inherently exploitative arrangements. Transparency must be 
part of a more participatory system that empowers workers and enables them, 
with union representation, to ameliorate their conditions from the bottom up. 
The liability-based model suggested by Pogge therefore remains relevant. Lead 
firms, as well as states, must accept their responsibilities and compensate for 
human rights abuses that occur as a result of their exercise (and abuse) of power.   
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